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The Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) in a nuclear power plant is a robust structure 
designed to withstand large seismic loads. After the terrorist attacks on September 
11 and the accident in the Fukushima nuclear power plant, special attention was 
focused on safety assessments and taking measures to mitigate possible accidents 
related to the spent fuel pool. This paper will provide an insight into spent fuel pool 
loss of coolant phenomenology and consequence mitigation strategies. Model of NPP 
Krško SFP was presented in MELCOR code which has been used as a case-study for 
evaluating accident propagation. The calculations were carried out using the latest 
version of MELCOR code which was updated for the analysis of severe accidents in 
nuclear spent fuel pools. 
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Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) is a storage space in nuclear power plant where fuel 
elements are temporarily discharged (during fuel exchange) or permanently after 
the fuel reaches a certain burnup. The fuel is placed in metal racks which hold it in 
the vertical position in the pool. The purpose of the racks is to support fuel weight 
and ensure the subcritical conditions with adequate cooling. It is possible that the 
SFP in certain circumstances (disturbances or accidents) remains without an 
external cooling system, which is acceptable for a shorter period of time. If a cooling 
and water makeup has not been established for a long period of time (from a few 
days to a week), fuel uncovery can lead to zirconium rod oxidation, and in severe 
accidents ignition of fuel elements, radioactivity release and hydrogen explosion [1]. 
A sudden loss of water from the pool can be cause by a fracture of the pool walls due 
to a major earthquake or other catastrophic event. The probability of radiological 
release from the SFP due to severe seismic accidents is estimated at one in 10 
million years (for some power plants). Despite the very low chance of such an event, 
experience has shown that weather disasters can lead to the severe accidents that 
can affect both nuclear reactor and spent fuel pool (Fukushima). The aim of this 
paper is to evaluate the response of a NPP Krško SFP to a loss-of-coolant inventory 
accident (LOCA). The paper is divided into three main sections. The first section 
explains phenomenology associated with different types of spent fuel pool failures, 
i.e. the rate of coolant leakage. In addition, measures for accidents mitigation and 
their effectiveness on a certain type of failure are listed. The second section 
describes the NPP Krško SFP model in the MELCOR code. The last section provides 
the results and discussion of accidental parameters for the different sizes and 
locations of the SFP cracks. 
 
2. LOSS OF COOLANT INVENTORY ACCIDENTS 
 
From the perspective of natural circulation and phenomenology, SFP loss of 
coolant accidents are divided into two categories: 
1) Complete loss of coolant inventory accident; 
2) Partial loss of coolant inventory accident. 
In a complete-loss-of-pool-coolant scenario, most of the oxidation of zirconium 
cladding occurs in an air environment: 
Zr + O2 → ZrO2 (1) 
For a partial-loss-of-pool-coolant scenario (or slow drainage in a complete-
loss-of-pool-coolant scenario), the initial oxidation of zirconium cladding will occur 
in a steam environment: 




Zr + 2H2Osteam → ZrO2 + 2H2 (2) 
Both reactions are highly exothermic, although Zirconium oxidation in the 
steam produces less heat energy per mole of Zircaloy than in the air, since part of 
the energy is spent on water dissociation to hydrogen and oxygen. The zirconium-
steam reaction leads to the formation of hydrogen, which can undergo rapid 
deflagration in the pool building, resulting in overpressures and structural damage. 
This damage can provide a pathway for air ingress to the pool, which can promote 
further zirconium oxidation and allow radioactive materials to be released into the 
environment. Debris from the damaged building can fall into the pool and block 
coolant passages. 
 
2.1 Mitigation Strategies for Spent Fuel Pool LOCA 
 
Loss of coolant accident has been analyzed through numerous tests, using 
data from operable PWR and BWR power plants. The recent study [2] analysed a 
wide spectrum of accidental scenarios and phenomenological uncertainties for 
determining the most important factors affecting the progression of accidents and 
fuel coolability. Based on the analyses carried out, activities that could influence the 
consequences of an accident are identified: adding makeup water, optimal pool 
configuration, dispersed fuel loading patterns, spray nozzles, building ventilation. 
At least two mitigation strategies are available to mitigate a loss-of-coolant event in 
a spent fuel pool: Repair the leak that is causing water to be lost and/or add makeup 
water. In the absence of leak repair, the location, size of the leak, magnitude of 
decay heat in the pool, and rate and timing of makeup water addition determines 
the effectiveness of the mitigation strategy. In the case where a spent fuel pool 
drains completely, adding makeup water will cover the lower portions of the fuel 
assemblies and block air convection. This could lead to rapid heat-up of the fuel and 
production of hydrogen as a result of zirconium-steam reaction, loss of coolable 
geometry in the assembly, and eventually self-sustaining oxidation of zirconium. 
The flow of makeup water must be high enough to cover a certain portion of the 
active fuel height before these conditions occur. Spraying water on top of the fuel 
assemblies may also be an effective strategy to provide additional cooling if makeup 
water capabilities are inadequate to maintain pool water levels above the tops of the 
fuel racks. Spraying the fuel can be an effective strategy for maintaining coolability 
of the fuel depending on droplet size, effect of counterflowing steam and fuel loading 
configuration. 
 
3. SFP MODEL IN MELCOR 
 
The MELCOR code was originally developed for analysis of severe accidents 
in BWR and PWR reactors [3]. The code is based on control volumes connected by 




flow paths (junctions) with specified frictional losses. Flow areas are either given or 
are determined as degraded material relocates. Generally, one-dimensional (1D) 
flows are considered. Since the version 1.8.6 MELCOR has been updated for use in 
investigating conditions in spent fuel pools under various loss-of-coolant conditions. 
The last version of MELCOR includes models for: 
• Air and steam oxidation; 
• Radiative, convective, and conductive heat transfer; 
• Hydrogen production and combustion; 
• Fuel degradation; 
• Boiling and two-phase thermal hydraulics; 
• Fission-product release and transport. 
 
3.1 NPP Krško Spent Fuel Pool model 
 
Spent fuel pool and associated building has been modeled as control volumes 
with the lumped parameters. The control volume geometry is mostly rectangular or 
cylindrical. The pool volume is divided into 9 control volumes, while the building is 
divided into 2 volumes, as shown in Fig 1. The outer space is modeled as a time-
independent volume ('ENVIRONMENT'). 
Fig. 1 Control volumes and flow paths in SFP model 
Warm water in its natural circulation comes out of racks, enters the 
RACK_EXIT volume, radially extends to the edge of the pool and enters the 
CASK_EXIT volume. Furthermore, the water descends to the CASK volume, passes 
through the INLET at the bottom and re-enters the racks. The space inside the 
metal racks is divided into 3 Rings and 2 Bypass. The volumes are interconnected 
by the flow paths, shown by the arrows in Fig 1.  
The spent fuel inside the pool is modeled in a similar way to the core in the 
reactor using the COR package [4]. Due to initial program constraints, fuel is 
modeled as a cylindrical structure with axial and radial splits. The fuel is divided 




into 14 axial layers and 3 radial rings (Fig 2.). For large pools the new approach 
using interacting channels instead of the fuel rings is able to provide more realistic 
results. 
Fig. 2 Spent fuel model 
The current configuration of NPP Krsko SFP, having old and new racks,  is 
result of first phase of reracking program. The first ring (Ring 1) is made up of all 
fuel elements in the old section of the SFP (old racks), i.e. the fuel with larger decay 
heat. The second ring consists of cooler elements in the new section of the SFP, 
while the third ring represents a small amount of water between racks and side 
walls of SFP. 
Concrete walls of SFP with metal liner, metal walls of FHB (Fuel Handling 
Building) and concrete floors on top of the pool (operating deck) represent the heat 
structures modeled in the HS package [5]. The concrete floor of SFP is modeled in 
the COR package due to the requirement to define the lower plenum and the 
reactor cavity below the fuel in MELCOR. Four concrete floors at the elevation of 
the pool top (11.8 m) were defined, with a total thickness of 0.5 m, surrounding all 
sides of SFP. Floors are rectangular geometries in which 9 temperature nodes are 
defined. The boundary condition on the left (inner) side were set as the convective 
heat transfer coefficient calculated by the HS package. On the right (outer) surface, 
a symmetric boundary conditions were defined, which represents an isolated 
surface. Due to program requirements, it was necessary to divide the side walls of 
the pool on the 17 axial layers and define the boundary (metal) structures above 
each radial ring of the fuel model in the COR package. Depending on the type of 
defined boundary condition, it was necessary to define the associate control volume 
for some heat structures. Therefore, the lowest two wall segments are connected 
with the INLET volume, the next 14 segments are connected with the RING 3 
volume, while the last three segments are connected with the RACK_EXIT volume 
(Fig. 3). 




Fig. 3 Heat structures and neighboring volumes 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The calculations were carried out for a moment in which the fuel, during the 
refueling, was completely transferred from the reactor to the pool (09.10.2016.). The 
total decay heat in the old part of the pool was 5.71 MW, with the total fuel mass 
(metal uranium) 147.315 t, while the decay heat in the new part was 0.573 MW 
with a uranium mass of 372.035 t. Some MELCOR calculation results were 
compared with an application that uses simple conservative models (mass and 
energy balances) for estimating basic data related to the safety of the spent fuel pool 
- SFPFA. 
 
4.1 Loss of coolant through a 1 cm2 crack 
 
This scenario describes the loss of the coolant through the hole at the bottom 
of the pool having cross section area of 1 cm2. A hole of such size is used in NEK in 
design bases water pool drainage analyzes. Fig. 4 depicts the inventory loss of the 
pool by the height of water in the control volumes 300, 110 and 100 (they extend 
through the entire height of the pool). The result shows that the water after 6.0e5 s 
drops to 0.5 m height. Fig. 5 shows comparison of MELCOR and SFPFA results. In 
the MELCOR results, the effect of water level stagnation to about 7.0e4 s is noticed 
even though the mass is lost, which can be explained by the increase in water 
volume due to heating, i.e., density reduction (Fig. 6). 
Fig.  7 shows the temperature of the axial segments of the fuel rod cladding, 
showing a sudden rise of the temperature after the fuel has become uncovered.  




Fig. 4 Water elevation change in 
MELCOR  
Fig. 5 MELCOR and SFPFA water 
elevation comparison 
Fig. 6 Water level swelling 
explanation 
Fig. 7 Fuel cladding heatup in Ring 1 
4.2 Loss of coolant through a 0.23 m2 crack 
The second case analyses the crack of a very large cross section located at the 
bottom elevation and at 0.5 m above the bottom. The crack of such size area is 
possible only during major seismic event (beyond design bases event), but it shows 
the fuel behavior in the case of almost instantaneous loss of coolant inventory. 
Water drains from the pool after 600s, except in the case of hole at 0.5 m where it 
stagnates below that elevation (Fig. 8). The water mass flow rate through the crack 
is exceptionally high (initial flow rate about 3000 kg/s) as can be seen in Fig. 9. The 
temperature of the fuel cladding in region 1 (Ring 1) is shown in Fig. 10 and 12. On 
those figures can be observed the effect of breakaway oxidation, which influences 
the significant cladding temperature rise. Fig. 11 shows the heat produced and 
exchanged within SFP by various types of heat transfer. The decay heat power 
(EFPD-RAT) is shown, which due to radionuclide release partially decreases over 
time. In addition, the convective heat transfer from the fuel, water oxidation, and 
heat transfer to the surrounding heat structures are shown. Fig. 13 shows the 
energy balance of the COR model. 
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Fig. 8 Crack position impact on water 
level 
Fig. 9 Water flow through liner crack
Fig. 10 Cladding temperature in Ring 
1 (crack on bottom) 
Fig. 11 Heat balance of pool contents - 
power 
Fig. 12 Cladding temperature in Ring 
1 (crack at 0.5m height) 
Fig. 13 Heat balance of pool contents - 
energy 
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In this paper the Spent fuel pool model of the NPP Krško was used for 
evaluation of loos-of-coolant inventory accident response using severe accident code 
MELCOR. Model has been used for partial (slow water drainage) and compete loss 
of coolant analysis. The case of coolant loss through a small hole prolongs fuel 
uncovery and consequent fuel heat-up. If the sudden loss of the coolant from the 
SFP occurs, natural circulation of air is established through the racks, but the 
results show that it is insufficient to prevent the overheating of the fuel elements 
with high decay heat. Accident mitigation measures should prevent fuel uncovery in 
case of partial loss of coolant by enabling water makeup. Due to the different 
phenomenology of the complete loss of coolant accident, the uncovered fuel should 
be cooled by allowing convective airflow through the racks, which can be achieved 




[1] Wagner, K. C., Gauntt, R. O. Mitigation of Spent Fuel Pool Loss-of-
Coolant Inventory Accidents And Extension of Reference Plant 
Analyses to Other Spent Fuel Pools.  SANDIA Letter Report revision 2, 
Sandia National Laboratories, November 2006. 
[2] Barto, et all. Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake 
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor. 
NUREG-2161, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 2014. 
[3] Humphries, L.L., B.A. Beeny, F. Gelbard, D.L. Louie, J. Phillips. 
MELCOR Computer Code Manuals; Vol. 1: Primer and Users’ Guide; 
Version 2.1. SAND2015-6691R, Sandia National Laboratories, 2015. 
[4] Cardoni, Jeffrey. MELCOR Model for an Experimental 17x17 Spent 
Fuel PWR Assembly. SAND2010-8249, Sandia National Laboratories, 
November 2010. 
[5] Kromar, Marjan, Kurincic, Bojan. Criticality Safety Analysis of the 
NPP Krško Storage Racks. Nuclear Energe for New Europe 2002, 
Kranjska Gora, Slovenia, 2002. 
 
J. Đaković, D. Grgić, Analysis of spent fuel pool loss of coolant inventory accident progression, Journal of Energy, vol. 66 (2017) Special Issue,  
p. 99–107
